A Brampton citizen recently asked me why we weren’t using the old “air raid sirens” to warn people when tornado alerts are sent out by Environment Canada. My first answer was that most alerts don’t actually lead to tornadoes, they only warn us of their possibility. If we were to sound a siren every time we get an alert, we would be activating the sirens probably 30 to 40 times a year and we have yet to have a tornado in Brampton. This will only lead to the “never cry wolf” kind of story.

Then, I started to think back about those sirens and wondered what happened to them. A bit of research and I found out that most were removed by the Department of National Defence (DND) back in the 1970s because they were rusting and becoming eyesores. The Federal Government had no money to maintain them. These sirens had been installed back in the 50s as part of the cold war effort to be prepared for air raids. Those sirens would give about twenty minutes advanced warning for people to take shelter in case of an enemy attack. With the change in technology, the air raids were replaced by the risk of nuclear missiles and with that the warning time went from twenty minutes to less than a minute. Evidently the sirens became obsolete under those conditions, hence the reasoning for cutting the maintenance budget.

Apparently there are a few left, some web sites show two in Toronto and a few in BC. DND admitted in an interview to the Toronto Star in 2007, that some may have been missed from the inventory. In fact, there was controversy as to who actually owned them. The Star called the City of Toronto, who referred them to the Province, who referred them to DND, who referred them back to the City of Toronto.

There was a time when the sirens made sense and the investment was justified. Times change however, and technology advances require us to constantly revisit the premise upon which we made a decision. In emergency management, much has changed as well. I started my emergency management career by having to pull out the emergency plan once a year, turn to the telephone list, and call everyone to make sure the phone numbers were still valid. Back then a blackberry was a fruit, a cell was a living organism, and a network was a social organization.

When I turned to embrace the field fully, I was first called an emergency planner. The function aimed at writing plans. It was a lonely function because nobody had any interest in participating in the planning. Plans were documents that rested on shelves and collected dust. Most of those who should have been using plans actually relied on their personal experience and hoped that they wouldn’t have to face something they had never encountered before. Situations did change and gradually got more complex, more devastating, and the responders started to turn to the plans, making us less lonely.

We then found out that planning was only part of the work. Plans needed to be shared, people needed to be trained on their uses, and the plans needed to be vetted by doing exercises. I became an emergency measures coordinator. The “measures” was part of the old legislation that would differentiate between the War Measures Act and the Peacetime Measures Act.

Once we had done everything we could to write plans – now with more input from those who would implement them – test the plans through exercises, and train the people, we thought that was it. Many of my peers stayed at that level. Then the concepts of prevention and mitigation came around, soon followed by recovery. We now had the next stage of our evolution. I became an emergency manager.

Again, many people seemed to think that this was it. We had reached the ultimate goal in this field. Surprise! We were not there yet.

Emergency Management deals with the physical aspect of emergencies. We build dams, we strengthen buildings, we rezone lands, we develop vaccines all for prevention purpose. We examine radars, we develop public alerting methodologies, we limit the speed of trains in urban surroundings, all for mitigation purposes. We build EOCs, we develop new communication technologies, we tell people what to stock for in their homes, all for preparedness purposes. We put out fires, we transport the wounded to hospitals, we redirect the traffic, we shelter the displaced, all in the response mode. Finally, we clean debris, we repair roads and bridges, we restore power, all in the recovery mode.

We are pretty good at managing all of this and the IMS is the ultimate tool in our arsenal. We can now celebrate our success. Or can we?

Way back even before my time, we used to send men to war, and expect them to get back to normal life when they came home, as if nothing had happened. When I was a kid, if I got hit by a bully, I would be told to suck it up and be a man. Today, we have Critical Incident Stress Management for our soldiers and first responders. Boys are now allowed to cry when they hurt, and bullying in unacceptable.

Emergency Management is all about the physical aspect, but the world has moved on to realize that the emotional and social aspect is just as important. We are now becoming resilience managers. We are now learning how to heal communities beyond cleaning up the debris and repairing the buildings. We now need to learn how to repair lives, how to heal broken ideals, how to recharge people who lost their dreams.

So where are you? Are you an emergency planner, an emergency measures coordinator, an emergency manager, or a budding resilience manager?

Are you still waiting for the air raid siren?

Fourteen years ago on September 11th 2001, I was just getting ready to go home from my last night shift as a Calgary firefighter when my Lieutenant ran into the dorm and yelled “a plane just hit the World Trade Centre!”

As I finished putting on my shoes and ambled down the hallway of #16 firehall, I envisioned a small four-seater may have tagged the building. We all know how wrong that was.

I sat and watched in horror as the second tower was hit, people leapt to their death, the crumbling of massive buildings and finally, the loss of emergency responders.

For almost a year all I could wonder was why? Why hit the World Trade Centre? Why were so many police and fire personnel killed? What could be learned from this?

I needed to find some answers and decided to leave the firehall as a senior firefighter and apply to become a Disaster Services Officer. I had basic emergency management training, intermediate ICS certifications, and was just beginning a business degree in emergency services while perusing any After Action Reports based on 9/11 and other disasters.

I was successful in the competition and was immediately “voluntold” by my chief at the time to work with our Water Services Department to identify all their hazards and develop contingency plans for the greatest threats to their business.

“What?” I didn’t sign up for this, I wanted to be able to plan for saving lives on a large scale, protect citizens and ensure responder safety. Why would I need to work with the water engineers?

It seems that the United States had uncovered a cache of plans that laid out how to destroy major ports, water plants, chemical facilities, hospitals, and other major assets (banks for example). This was my first realization of the incredible cascading impacts that critical infrastructure losses have on each other, and the reason for sending me to our Water Services Department to build their emergency and continuity management program.

My first HIRA was based upon an Australian methodology that would provide a visual representation of the impact of the hazard on business operations. You know the chart: green to yellow to red with all the hazards listed in the boxes. The greatest threat to Calgary’s water operation was flooding, followed

by contamination, then terrorism. I researched internal plans and found that although prepared, the integration of a holistic approach to emergency management for the corporation was lacking. The mechanism of the hazard was irrelevant (natural, technological, man-made) and I had to work fast to provide emergency management structure for the leadership team and put crisis communication processes in place for field staff—and quickly, before we had a major emergency or disaster on my watch.

The emergence of Public Safety Canada in 2003 marked a critical point in the relationship between Emergency Management and Critical Infrastructure (CI). Chief among these was the absorption of Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) into the realm of public safety and security. Through moving this office from National Defence squarely within the purview of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we began to see the convergence of all-hazards planning and national civil preparedness for physical structures as well as financial, energy, telecommunications and even government services.

It was initially the ripple effects of 9/11 which spurred these actions, along with a clear acknowledgement of the increasingly complex risk environment, and a large amount of corresponding legislation. However, it was the subsequent years and the waning of Jean Chrétien’s administration which gave rise to a far deeper acknowledgement; Canada’s vulnerability was, and remains, fundamentally impacted by a) increases in extreme weather events (caused by climate change), b) aging infrastructure, and c) our reliance on advanced technologies (and reliance on those aforementioned infrastructures). In a report titled “Threats to Canada’s Critical Infrastructure” dated March 2003, Public Safety Canada put into words a realisation with potentially far-reaching impact:

“The increased urbanization of Canadian communities, and the concomitant need for additional vital, uninterrupted, services for Canada’s bourgeoning cities raises the possibility that our critical infrastructure is more vulnerable than ever.”

A year later, the federal government proposed the creation of a ‘National Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy’.

If we fast forward 5 years to 2009, when the senate committee thought fit to mention the strategy in its document titled ‘Emergency Management in Canada; How the fine arts of bafflegab and procrastination hobble the people who will be trying to save you when things get really bad…’ (not a made up title!), they included this informative image regarding the project:

Clearly, the sudden and important revelation of 2003 took a back seat, and rapidly fizzled into the background noise of parliament hill.

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Interestingly, in the National Strategy for critical infrastructure primer which closely followed the aforementioned report, the federal government highlighted that the eventual end-product of the initiative would focus on the following:

“…appropriate combination of security measures… business continuity practices … and emergency management planning to ensure adequate response procedures are in place to deal with unforeseen disruptions and natural disasters.”

 While this is a useful sentiment, the absence of a well-formed national strategy has left municipalities, provinces and territories across Canada to develop their own programs, collaborations, initiatives and approaches to EM. While these are generally comprehensive, effective programs specifically tailored to meet the particular needs of each community, most focus on the more pressing and immediate concerns such as Emergency Social Services (ESS), scheduled event planning, and public awareness and lack the resources to adequately address issues which cross jurisdictional boundaries to the federal scale.

What still remains is what I can only refer to as the elephant in the room; our aging critical infrastructure.

A recent quote from prominent writer Kathryn Schultz, featured recently in the New Yorker, comes to mind: “How can [society] being to right itself when its entire infrastructure and culture developed in a way that leaves it profoundly vulnerable to natural disaster?” how indeed. While she is referring to more here than just physical infrastructure, she is entirely accurate in her assessment of the issues we face being the unfortunate result of our historical context.

So how then, do we move forward in the face of this reality? In the absence of a national CI strategy, how are municipalities supposed to address issues pertaining to the myriad of private, public, local, provincial and federal assets, all with varying degrees of access, vulnerability and control? It’s an Emergency Management nightmare at the best of times to even comprehend the risk to our Critical Infrastructure, let alone the potential scale of the subsequent impact on communities which rely on it. My observation has been that most identify the hazards and develop a risk profile, but struggle to move beyond this step.

I suspect that these challenges may remain even beyond the development of the much anticipated Critical Infrastructure Strategy – such is often the nature of wide-reaching federal strategy (though clearly one would hope it’s effective in addressing some of the most critical infrastructure vulnerabilities). However, I would suggest that there are ways to manage the effects of damage to CI, despite the aforementioned challenges to developing a four-pillar approach. While it is perhaps against our better judgement as Emergency Managers to focus purely on response/recovery activities, Damage Assessment programs can provide some quick wins in this regard.

Many municipalities in British Columbia, with lessons learned from experienced cities such as Christchurch, have begun to develop comprehensive Rapid Damage Assessment (RDA) programs in an effort to streamline response and recovery efforts. Primarily, these programs create a platform for engagement of personnel as subject matter experts, public participation, and serve to integrate existing internal emergency response efforts with formal EM efforts. In this way, they inadvertently touch on many important goals of EM; engagement, public education, and business continuity to name a few.

A municipality with an RDA program is likely to have a more intimate understanding of the disaster or emergency at hand, in a timelier manner, and with greater clarity across departments and agencies than one without. It is also undoubtedly in a better position to allocate precious municipal resources and surge capacity to the most vulnerable and impacted areas of the community.

Consider ‘lifeline services’ provided by your municipality and any associated boards and agencies. Water and sanitary systems are some of the most important and susceptible to damage, but also fall firmly in the jurisdiction of municipal or regional bylaws and in-house expertise. The same can be said for building and transportation infrastructure which is often enforced or managed by municipal workers. Engaging your building, public works and engineering departments can be the first step in creating a response strategy which addresses both immediate damage, and the broader Emergency Management goals, including situational awareness and prioritisation of response efforts.

However, I would also argue that it is not enough to simply expect municipalities to develop RDA programs, especially considering that many EM programs are already stretched beyond their means. I have previously referred to the wealth of knowledge which exists elsewhere in Canada and beyond, and I firmly believe that there are ways to share and benefit from this as a community of EM professionals. If we cannot have a National CI strategy, we should at least be considering the development of a platform which enables us to share knowledge pertaining to CI risk management and Damage Assessment initiatives.

As I think about this issue I am constantly reminded of the words of Naomi Klein in her 2009 novel ‘Shock Doctrine’

“Public infrastructure around the world is facing unprecedented stress, with hurricanes, cyclones, floods and forest fires all increasing in frequency and intensity. It’s easy to imagine a future in which growing numbers of cities have their frail and long-neglected infrastructures knocked out by disaster”

 If we are to weather the oncoming storm, we will need a platform which reaches beyond simply highlighting GIS solutions or digital tools to the development of a national framework for comprehensive Damage Assessment, one which includes training, measurement metrics, tactics, program development tools and more. Integrating our collective understanding of CI risk assessment and Damage Assessment is critical as we begin to understand how we will manage the extraordinary problem we now face.

Maintaining a state of readiness to implement an Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) is critical to mitigating the impact of dam failure. Ontario Power Generation (OPG) has integrated an all-hazards emergency management approach with its Dam Safety Program; capturing key elements within a managed system to ensure that a state of readiness is maintained, both within the organization as well as with stakeholders and community first responders. The Program includes routine elements of stakeholder meetings, call tests, tabletop and full-scale exercises, all built around a process that encompasses continuous improvement to the response and recovery capabilities.

Engaging local communities in the development of emergency exercises has improved their awareness of potential hazards resulting from dam failures and served to build relationships which will be critical to the response should it be required during a real event. The exercises carried out by OPG have played an important role in identifying deficiencies in processes, communication protocols and technical resources while building core competencies in emergency response skills.

While each exercise would have specific lessons learned, there are some general items that are useful to list for those entering the exercise design process based on OPG’s experience in conducting exercises since the late 1990’s;

  • Build Up – Exercises are intended to test the plan, not the people. In order for exercises to be successful, staff need to be sufficiently prepared to participate. By first conducting a functional exercise without preparation, staff may feel discouraged and fail to appreciate the value of conducting the exercise. In order to encourage success, staff must be provided with adequate training for their role in emergency response and the overall processes outlined in the EPRP. Following the training, tabletop exercises should be used to build confidence and understanding of the roles. The Players Handbook has also proven to be a valuable tool to set the context for participation in the exercise.
  • Design Team Engagement – In order to ensure a realistic and comprehensive exercise scenario, it is necessary to engage staff with a broad spectrum of expertise from across the organization. For example, if an exercise is based on a hydrologic event, it may beneficial to include a hydro-technical engineer to analyze flow data.
  • Engaging the “B Team” – though the primary instinct is that the response will be carried out by the “A Team”, circumstances during an actual event may dictate that others may be called upon to fill a role. Tabletops and Functional Exercises provide prime opportunities to build depth in the response organization by introducing “B Team” members as Evaluators or Observers, or allowing a more experienced responder to provide coaching during the event. Having additional staff trained and comfortable in emergency response builds organizational resiliency.

Ref. Emergency Action Planning – In Action: Practices and Lessons Learned at OPG; Bennett and Serota – CDA Banff 2014